amidst lingering doubts about the africa rising narrative and whether indeed africa has reached a take-off stage in its development trajectory as charles robertson et al in their 2012 book the fastest billion would have us believe, the launch of the tripartite in 2015 was an enormous signal that africa is working together and committed to its common vision for a large single continental market to promote trade and investment. adopted in 1991, the continental integration template aims to progressively achieve an african economic community by 2028, with the possibility of fast-tracking the process. this longstanding strategy which addresses the diminutive size of african economies by providing operators with economies of scale, is as much alive today as in the heydays of political pan-africanism in the 1960s, the platform for the energy and resources for the struggles of the time for political freedom. in this sense then, the sheer geographical and economic size of the tripartite free trade area, by covering half of africa, goes down in history as a milestone in african political and economic history alongside the formation of the organisation for african unity in 1963 and the african union in 2000. building on theories of economic integration over the years, africa has evolved its own unique approach that is grounded in its development challenges. rather than constructing a theory based on eficient use of deployed resources and that presumes full employment, africa has come up with what is called a developmental approach to regional integration, which equally prioritizes industrial and infrastructure development as market integration. a free market without products to trade is quite unhelpful in addressing the development challenges of job creation; and without infrastructure it would be near impossible to move products and people around, and the costs of production would be prohibitive. economic integration in africa is therefore based on the three pillars of market integration to create free trade areas that facilitate trade and investment, industrial development to create products and employment, and infrastructure development. just as the private sector have a key role as the engine for job creation and development, so do governments. victoria bateman in her book entitled markets and growth in early modern europe, has looked at evidence from modern europe and going back to babylonia and a critical observation to make is therefore that the tripartite initiative is not purely a free trade agreement, rather it is a development agreement. the tripartite free trade area agreement represents an unequivocal political message that formulation and adoption of a single trade regulatory regime is feasible in economic integration in africa; in this case covering half of africa in geographical and economic terms. the agreement has detailed annexes setting out the rules and norms on customs, technical and health standards, safeguards, removal of unnecessary trade barriers, settlement of disputes about the meaning and application of the agreements, and how to determine goods produced in the region. such a single trade regime reduces regulatory and compliance complexity and costs for both government and economic operators, which contributes to facilitation of trade and investment. it can be added in the same breath that the agreement is complemented with robust programs for industrial and infrastructure development. the free trade area will yield economies of scale and goodwill among governments for collaboration, which enable critical levels of investment and industrialization, as well as cross- border infrastructure projects for transportation and energy as well as telecommunications, drawing on public and private investments. the tripartite industrial development program focuses on agro-processing, chemical and minerals value chains. a critical observation to make is therefore that the tripartite initiative is not purely a free trade agreement, rather it is a development agreement. concluded that markets by themselves have not been the source of economic growth contrary to conventional wisdom, but rather that governments have provided the overall framework for markets to prosper, and that markets have collapsed where there has been no government. negotiating the tripartite came with a number of challenges. it was a time and resource intensive exercise, involving national and regional preparations. differences of opinion among the countries on fundamental issues such as the type of rules of origin to adopt, the level of ambition for market opening, and the pace or frequency of negotiation sessions, had to be addressed. the inal positions were half-way houses and therefore unsatisfactory to either side in some key respects. on rules of origin for instance, the chapters on textiles are still being consulted on and product speciic rules have not been negotiated and concluded. on the market access front however, some countries were able to undertake quite generous liberalization but on condition of reciprocity in order to deal with free riding. throughout the negotiations, it often appeared as though what the political leaders expected to be easy was technically overwhelming. the tripartite fta was in the end launched one year late after the three-year road map could not be met; even then with a number of outstanding issues that were set down as a built-in agenda for more 16 | april - september 2017